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UNDERPRICING OF NEW ISSUES LISTED ON THE SECOND BOARD OF 
THE KUALA LUMPUR STOCK EXCHANGE DURING 1989 TO 1994 
ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the underpricing of Initial Public Offerings ("IPOs") listed on the Second 
Board of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange ("KLSE") during 1 989 to 1 994. The results 
show that the average return, based on the difference between the first day closing price 
and the offer price, is approximately 65%. However, the returns after the first day up-to the 
first month of listing normally decline, eventhough there are not significantly difference from 
the returns received on the first day of listing. During the third month of listing, the 
underpricing becomes larger and this continues up-to the third year, where the average 
underpricing is 251 %. It is clear from this study that the new issues are mostly underpriced. 
In this study, the relationships between level of underpricing and other variables like 
underwriters and auditors involved in the IPOs, the size of public issues and the nature of 
business of the listing company are also studied. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Initial Public Offering ("I PO") is defined as the first sale of common stocks by a 
company to the public. It is a method used by company to get listed on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange ("KLSE") through issuance of shares. As at the end of 
June, 1 997, the KLSE had a total of 657 companies of which 431 (66%) are listed 
on the Main Board and 226 (34%) are listed on the Second Board with a total 
market capitalisation of RM755.6 billion. 1 
The Second Board was officially introduced on November 1 1 ,  1 988. This Board is 
catered for small-and-medium-sized companies to tap the capital market and grow. 
The first company, Lim Kim Hai Holdings Berhad, got on the Board in May, 1 989. 
Since then until 1 994, there were a total of 1 31 companies listed on the Second 
Board. However, during the same period, six companies, i.e. Lim Kim Hai Holdings 
Berhad, Tiong Nam Transport Holdings Berhad, KYM Holdings Berhad (formerly 
known as Polypulp Paper Industries Berhad), Corrugated Carton Products Berhad, 
Mancon Berhad and Actacorp Holdings Berhad, included in this study have been 
transferred to the Main Board. A complete list of all the 1 31 companies listed on the 
Second Board is as given in Appendix 1. 
Some of the characteristics of the companies in the Second Board are described in 
Table 1. 
1 "Not Jus(About Obeying The law,' The Edge C8mmuniostlons Sdn. Bhd:-; August 25, 1997. 
YEAR 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
TOTAL 
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Table 1 (a) Listing By Industry 
INDUSTRIAL CONSUMER TRADINGI CONSTRUCTION FINANCE TOTAL 
SERVICES 
2 - - - - 2 
9 - 1 2 - 12 
1 1  1 3 3 - 18 
9 5 4 1 1 20 
1 1  8 8 4 1 32 
20 12  8 7 - 47 
62 26 24 17 2 131 
Table 1 (b) Average Offered Price, 1ST Year Average Underpricing, Average Paid-Up 
Capital and Average Number of Shares Offered 
YEAR AVERAGE 1'" YEAR AVERAGE AVERAGE PAID-UP AVERAGE NUMBER OF 
OFFERED UNDERPRICING CAPITAL SHARES OFFERED 
PRICE (RM) (%) ('Mil) ('Mil.) 
1989 1 .25 97 1 7. 073 6.068 
1990 1 .81 78 1 6.480 5.674 
1991 1 .89 34 16.640 5.635 
1992 2.31 1 05 1 7.603 4. 558 
1993 2.52 1 44 1 7.980 4.290 
1994 2.73 1 1 7  1 8.356 4.557 
AVERAGE 2.09 96 17.355 5.130 
The KLSE practise the "Open Market" system. In the open market system, the 
Securities Commission ("SC") car)not stop an investor from speculating or investing 
for short-term profits. However, the SC has espoused that investors should 
understand the risks involved when they make a speculative investment decision. 2 
This is particularly true for companies listed on the Second Board. The rationale 
that "encourages" the speculation on the Second Board is based on the economics 
of supply and demand. The small number of shares issued per company and the 
small capitalisation make it easy for large investors to manipulate the stocks. 
2 "How An IPO Is Priced,· The New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) 89fhad;April 16, 1997. 
UNDERPRICING OF NEW ISSUES LISTED ON THE SECOND BOARD OF THE KLSE DURING 1989 TO 1994 
Page 6 of 27 
However, another important issue that always link to companies listed on the 
Second Board is the underpricing of new issues. Underpricing is simply defined as 
the difference between the offered and the listed price. Investors who buy the new 
issues get a bargain at the expense of the company's original shareholders. 
Therefore, it is not surprised that a successful application for shares in an IPO is a 
sure bet for quick profits, which is why IPOs are often heavily oversubscribed. In 
Malaysia, the average over-subscription rate of IPOs is 80 times. One of the big 
puzzles remained in our capital market is the question of "Why is the typical IPO 
substantially underpriced?" In 1996, an investor was literally assured of an average 
1 00% gain over the offer price of the Main Board IPOs and an average of 200% for 
the Second Board. 
For investors, they buy the new issues because they believe the new issues are 
underpriced (Rock, 1 986). This means the public perceives the purchase to be a 
short term investment which guarantees big profits with low or minimum risk (Tinic, 
1 988). With this kind of belief, it is not surprising that every time when there is a 
new issue, the shares are overwhelmingly oversubscribed. The underpricing of new 
issues is a universal phenomena, as it is also observed in countries like the United 
States ("US") and the United Kingdom ("UK"). Studies of IPO pricing in many 
countries consistently show that investors who purchased shares at the offer price 
have earned abnormal returns. These abnormal returns could be as high as 5 times 
of normal returns in developing markets as compared to 1 .5 times registered in 
developed countries. Therefore, chasing after new issues is considered as a 
prudent investment behaviour in most markets. 
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2.0 OBJECTIVE OF THIS RESEARCH 
The objective of this research is to examine the underpricing of new issues listed on 
the Second Board. Investors are well-aware that prices of IPOs increase 
substantially on their first day of going public, especially in healthy economic times. 
This is an underpricing of the original issue. This research attempts to ascertain the 
underpricing of 1 31 new issues listed on the Second Board during the period of 
1 989 to 1 994 and observe the short-term and long-term gains to investors. 
This study looks at the level of underpricing on the first day of trading compared to 
the offer price, excess underpricing after the first day of trading and also attempts to 
find out the reasons for the initial high level of underpricing of these new issues. 
Besides the prevailing market conditions at the time of issuing play a significant role 
in the performance of new issues, other factors such as the size of issues, the 
percentage of secondary issues and the nature of the business of the listing 
company are also considered important determinants in the level of underpricing. 
In the process of listing, the service of underwriters and auditors is mandatorily 
required. The level of underpricing of IPOs �as been suggested to be related to the 
type of underwriters and auditors employed, that is the more reputable the 
underwriters and auditors are, the Jess the uncertainty, and therefore, Jess premium 
on the offer price. This research also tries to ascertain this conjecture on the 
Second Board's IPOs. 
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1.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
CHAPTER 2 
The empirical evidence accumulated during the recent years for almost every capital 
market in the world concludes that IPOs provide significant abnormal returns on 
their first day of listing. While there is considerable debate concerning the 
underlying rationale for such returns, the literature is almost unanimous on the 
evidence of deliberate underpricing to compensate for uncertainty. 
Studies pertaining to new issues conducted in the US and the UK support this view. 
Reilly and Hatfield's (1 969) report of underpricing of IPOs in the US has been 
followed by reports of underpricing in several developed and developing stock 
market. 3 Underpricing of new issues not only occurs in the developed capital 
markets, but also in emerging capital markets like Malaysia. The only difference is 
the degree of underpricing between IPOs in developed countries which show lower 
level of underpricing. Several studies on the new issues in Malaysia report 
substantial underpricing. However, the shortfall of these studies is that they were 
conducted based on specific samples for different periods. 
3 Davis and Yeomans (1976) for the UK, Finn and Higham (1983) for Australia, Dawson (1984) for Singapore 
and Wong Chiang (1986) for Malaysian markets. 
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Yong's (1 989) study entitled Behaviour of New Issues in Malaysia concluded that 
the returns for new issues in Malaysia from 1 983 to 1 988, based on the difference 
between the first day closing price and the offer price, were approximately 167%. 
This study also indicated that Malaysian new issues were mostly underpriced and 
over-subscribed. This study also recommended that the authorities concerned in 
dealing with the new issues should not hesitate to increase the offer price to a more 
"acceptable" level without the fear of under-subscription. 
Dawson (1 987) compared the performance of new issues in markets of Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Malaysia for a period from 1 978 to 1 983. The study found positive 
initial returns on these three markets with the Malaysian market being the highest 
with an average of 167%. However, subsequent positive returns were no longer 
available on the Hong Kong and Singapore markets on the secondary market. With 
the Malaysian stocks, the price changes were still positive and kept increasing 
eventhough at a smaller rate compared to the initial pricing. 
Ariff and Chung (1 995) in their study of IPOs in Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, the 
UK and the US revealed the extent of underpricing in these five markets. The 
average underpricing for Australia was 29%, for Malaysia was 1 04%, for Singapore 
was 37%, for the UK was 9% and for the US was 1 9%. Therefore, from these five-
country samples, the average underpricing of new issues in the three developed 
countries, i.e. Australia, the UK and the US, could be estimated to be 1 9% relative 
to the average of 70%, which was very high in the two emerging markets. It also 
appeared that the level of underpricing in these two emerging markets was about 
three-and-a-half times that in the developed capital markets. 
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Yuen (1 995) in his study for new issued A shares (these shares could only be 
traded by Chinese nationals with yuan in mainland markets) listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange for a period of five years found that these new issues were 
underpriced as high as 400%. These included an average underpriced of 306% in 
1 994 and an average of 400% for new issues listed between 1 990 and 1 993. This 
incorrectly valued new issues have misled the public and fuelled speculation as 
investors tended to underestimate the risk associated to the IPOs. In this study 
also, it was found that IPOs in Hong Kong were underpriced by an average of 25% 
between 1 988 and 1 992. These figures were adjusted to 1 9% after accounting for 
normal market change. 
A very large percentage of shares outstanding were also found to have changed 
hands on the first few after-market days and buyers would be able to make a 
lucrative amount with the large discrepancy between IPOs and the actual market 
price. 
Brennan and Franks (1 996) found that IPOs in the UK were often deliberately 
underpriced as a means of the founding directors retaining control of their floatation. 
This study also concluded that the greater the underpricing, the smaller the size of 
shares held after an IPO by outside shareholders. By underpricing, the offer 
became more attractive, the rationing of shares become more acute and the lower 
the likelihood of outsiders purchasing stakes which might give leverage over control 
of the company. 
Menon and Williams (1 990) in their study of Auditor Credibility and Initial Public 
Offerings concluded that there was an important attribute of auditor credibility that 
brought to an audit management. It was contended that information asymmetry 
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problem also led to a demand for credible auditors in companies going public. 
Companies have incentives to provide favourable future earnings by employing 
reputable auditors. The limited information available on companies going public 
could be overcome by employing credible auditors which could convey monitoring 
cost advantage as well. Investment bankers also have a preference for credible 
auditors since they rely on audited financial statements in certifying the value of the 
company and determining whether to underwrite the offering. 
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CHAPTER 3 
1.0 RESEARCH DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A sample of 1 31 companies were selected for the period 1 989 to 1 994. Public 
records in various issues of Malaysian Business, Investors Digest, publications 
available through Internet, Daily Report of the KLSE, annual reports of the SC and 
the KLSE were assessed to obtain values for the variables. In addition, resource 
centres of KLSE and MIDF Consultancy were also utilised. 
To analyse share price movements subsequent to listing of each new issue, the 
offer price and prices on the first day, first week, first-, third-, sixth-month of trading 
and so on until the thirty-sixth month of trading were extracted. Next, for each new 
issue, the rate of underpricing over (a) a shorter time period of less than 12 months 
and (b) a long time period over the next three years were estimated. This would 
help to distinguish short and longer term price changes. The formula used is as 
shown below:-
Underpricing on the first day of listing, rj = [ (Pj - Poffer) I Poffer ) * 1 00% 
where rj is the return for period i, 
Pj is the closing price for time i 
and P offer is the offer price 
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CHAPTER 4 
1.0 COMPARA riVE FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
1.1 Short And Long-Run Performance Of New Issues 
There is a common perception that IPOs are underpriced, not only in Malaysia but 
even in more devolved markets such as the US. Underpricing of IPOs naturally 
provides opportunities for investors to generate wealth. For investment bankers, 
underpricing is a way of ensuring good respond to an issue. Overpricing the issue 
might tum the investors away and result in the failure of the issue. However, 
underpricing is a double-edged weapon, because if a company underprices its issue 
too much, it is losing out on the opportunity to raise funds at cheaper rates. The 
premium pricing in a free market is a delicate balancing act for both new issuers and 
their investment bankers. 
In 1 994, the average underpricing of new issues listed on Second Board during the 
first day of listing was 93%. However, for the entire sample under study (1 989 to 
1 994), the figure was 65%. The measure of underpricing and exuberance of the 
markets in 1 994 can be seen from the level of underpricing of these issues. 
Nineteen companies generated about 1 00 to 228% of underpricing out of a total of 
47 companies listed in that year. Some market sources attribute the big 
underpricing to a general bull market in financial stocks, but others acknowledge 
that such a huge first-day increase in share prices could also mean initial valuations 
were not set properly to begin with. 
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(a) Short-Run Performance 
The extent of underpricing over the first six months upon listing is as summarised in 
Table 1 (a) 
Table 1 (a) Short-Run Underpricing 
PARTICULAR FIRST FIRST FIRST THIRD SIXTH AVERAGE 
DAY WEEK MONTH MONTH MONTH 
1989 72% 84% 28% 85% 92% 72% 
1990 59% 53% 45% 54% 63% 55% 
1991 40% 40% 36% 39% 22% 36% 
1992 42% 38% 43% 46% 61 % 46% 
1993 84% 80% 97% 128% 208% 1 1 9% 
1994 93% 88% 81 % 92% 95% 90% 
AVERAGE 65% 64% 55% 74% 90% 70% 
A look at all the 1 31 companies listed on the Second Board show that the first day 
average underpricing is 65%. However, there is a slight downward pressure in the 
first-week and month, but the premiums recovered higher than first-day level over 
the three and six months. The lowest underpricing among the companies during 
their first day of listing was -8.4% (Trenergy (Malaysia) Berhad) and the highest was 
228% (EPE Power Corporation Berhad). There were two new issues marketed 
below the offer price, i.e. Trenergy (Malaysia) Berhad and Seng Hup Electrical 
Company Berhad. 
Companies are conservative and therefore do not set higher offer price for the fear 
that the results cannot match expectations later. Investment bankers tend to advise 
companies to price their offers "cheaply" because that would guarantee a sell-out 
and yield positive returns. A high price would mean dull trading on the first day. For 
instance, MTD Capital Berhad (listed in 1 994) which had the highest offer price rose 
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only 50% above its issue price of RM6.60 on debut compares to the average of 
65% for all the companies listed on the Second Board during the period of study. 
This is also much lower than 1 994's average underpricing of 93%. 
Underpricing allows the new issues to do well during the first day of listing, thereby 
helping the issue to maintain a good image. Underpricing also leads to 
expectations among speculators that new shares are sure winners by holding the 
stocks in the short-run only. The loosers of new issues due to underpricing are the 
original owners, those who decided to sell their private holdings to the public, it is an 
opportunity cost for them. On the other hand, the winners (in most cases) are the 
investors who bought the new issues at the IPO price. Let's take Lim Kim Hai 
Holdings Berhad as an illustration. The company's share was offered at RM1 .50 
per share and closed at RM1 .91 on its first day of trading. This provides a 27% 
return on its first day of listing. 
(b) Long-Run Performance 
Table 1 (b) Long-Run Underpricing 
PARTICULAR FIRST YEAR SECOND YEAR THIRD YEAR 
1989 97% 1 33% 1 16% 
1990 78% 93% 21 9% 
1991 34% 235% 21 8% 
1992 1 05% 1 68% 1 43% 
1993 1 44% 1 30% 442% 
1994 1 1 7% 344% 367% 
AVERAGE 96% 184% 251% 
AVERAGE 
1 1 5% 
1 30% 
162% 
1 39% 
239% 
276% 
177% 
In the long-run, most shares are able to hold the prices at such levels long after their 
debut, suggesting the enormous price gains are due to serious underpricing of new 
issues rather than speculation. Even though underpricing is common in emerging 
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markets, however, the scale seen in Malaysian issues is phenomenal. This can be 
seen from the level of underpricing in 1 994, which is 276%, as compared to 
previous year's 239%. 
(c) Listing By Industry 
This research also attempts to look at the level of underpricing for companies listed 
in different industries. 
Table 1 (c) Short-Run Underpricing Bv Industrv 
PARTICULAR FIRST FIRST FIRST THIRD SIXTH AVERAGE 
DAY WEEK MONTH MONTH MONTH 
INDUSTRIAL 67% 62% 57% 78% 106% 74% 
CONSUMER 75% 66% 62% 68% 76% 69% 
TRADINGI 78% 73% 81 % 92% 128% 90% 
SERVICES 
CONSTRUCTION 80% 89% 1 05% 1 1 6% 122% 102% 
FINANCE 74% 76% 66% 53% 1 2% 56% 
AVERAGE 75% 73% 74% 81% 89% 78% 
For the last nine years, the economy of Malaysia has been enjoying an average 
annual growth in GDP of 8%. Mainly due to this factor, companies listed under the 
construction sector enjoying an average of 1 02% underpricing during the first six-
month of listing as compared to Second Board's industry average of 78%. In the 
short-run, construction sector's companies out-performed companies of other 
sectors. 
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Table 1 (d) Long-Run Underpricing By Industrv 
PARTICULAR FIRST YEAR SECOND YEAR THIRD YEAR AVERAGE 
INDUSTRIAL 1 07% 21 0% 206% 1 74% 
CONSUMER 93% 21 4% 302% 203% 
TRADINGI 1 25% 256% 536% 306% 
SERVICES 
CONSTRUCTION 98% 256% 334% 229% 
FINANCE 1 22% 1 04% 1 75% 1 34% 
AVERAGE 109% 208% 311% 209% 
In the long run, trading/services sector out-performed construction and other sectors 
with an average underpricing of 1 25% for the first-year, 256% for the second-year 
and 536% for the third-year. However, the level of underpricing for construction 
sector remains high at second spot with an average underpricing of 98% for the 
first-year, 256% for the second-year and 334% for the third-year. 
Five out of the top ten performers (measured by the level of underpricing) are 
dominated by industrial products related companies, while three from 
trading/services sector and the remaining two from companies related to 
construction. However, the bottom ten under-achievers are companies from all the 
five sectors except finance. 
1.2 Underwriters 
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Almost all companies go public primarily because they need money for investments. 
All other reasons are of secondary importance. Once public, companies can easily 
go back to the market to raise more cash. Public companies tend to have higher 
profile than private companies. This is important in industries where success 
requires customers and suppliers to make long term commitments. Credible experts 
like underwriters (in this research, underwriter is referred to investment banker and 
are used interchangeably) and auditors are necessary to ensure investors that their 
money is well-invested. In addition, the advise of credible neutral advisors need to 
be sought to evaluate the company. 4 
Rock (1 986) proposed that the issuing companies and investors are uncertain about 
the value of the new issues, therefore, the shares must be offered at the discount to 
guarantee purchase by the uninformed investors. Therefore, one of the biggest 
challenges that facing the underwriter for a new issue is setting the offer price when 
there is no price history for the company. There are potential costs from over or 
underpricing. 5 If the underwriter sets the offer price too high, then the underwriters 
risk an under-subscription. On the other hand, if the underwriter sets the offer price 
too low, the existing shareholders of the company, i.e. the owners prior to the IPO, 
will suffer an opportunity loss. 
In order to reduce the risk of under-subscription of new issues, the underwriter has 
greater incentive to reduce the offer price. This is particularly true in emerging 
4 Welch, Ivo "IPO - The Initial Public Offerings Resource Page, "The Anderson School of Management at UCLA, 
May, 1997. 
5 Lewis, Craig "Issuing Securities and Capital Structure," Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt 
University, 1995. 
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markets like Malaysia where market conditions do change substantially between the 
time a price is determined and the actual time of approval. 
However, the other side of the argument is that, share priCing is largely a function of 
investor demand, which helps to push up or down the prices. 6 The role of the 
underwriter is to place part of the company's shares, where it is also not the 
underwriter's interest of floating the company at a price that is not sustainable. On 
the other hand, it is also common for underwriter to price the new issues at a 
discount to either the issuing company's nearest listed competitors, or to the sector, 
or to the market. The rationale of this is being to give investors the incentives to 
subscribe for the new issues. Competitive pricing should also stimulate demand in 
the after market when the shares begin trading. 
The empirical evidence on whether IPOs tend to be overpriced or underpriced 
strongly supports the contention that the offer price on IPOs is too low. In Malaysia, 
for instance, across all new issues listed on the Second Board during the period of 
1 989 to 1 994, the average underpricing was 65% (during their first day of listing). 
Therefore, the underwriters involve in the new issues have the huge responsibility to 
ensure that the offer price of IPO should really reflect the true value of the 
companies. 
6 "The Sombre And Sensitive Of Pricing," The Financial Times Limited, November 9, 1994. 
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In Malaysia, new issues are subjected to public scrutiny by the investment bankers 
(any one or more of the merchant banks available in the country), the SC (Capital 
Issues Committee prior to March, 1 992), the Registrar of Companies and KLSE. 7 
Merchant banks that are acting as the underwriters for the new issues are 
categorised using two-tier system. Presently, there are twelve merchant banks in 
the country, of which five, namely (i) Aseambankers Malaysia Berhad, (ii) 
Commerce International Merchant Bankers Berhad, (iii) Arab-Malaysian Merchant 
Bank Berhaa, (iv) RHB Sakura Merchant Bankers Berhad and (v) Perwira Affin 
Merchant Bank Berhad are grouped under Tier-1 and others are considered as Tier-
2. The involvement of these underwriters in IPOs is summarised in Table 2 (aJ. 
Table 2 (a) Underwriters Involved In IPOs 
TYPE '89 % '90 % '91 % '92 % '93 % '94 % TOTAL % 
Tier-1 2 100 5 42 10 56 11 55 17 53 34 72 79 80 
Tier-2 0 0 7 52 8 44 9 45 15 47 13 28 52 40 
TOTAL 2 100 12 100 18 100 20 100 32 100 47 100 131 100 
There is no obvious sign showing the popularity for companies listed on the Second 
Board to engage Tier-1 merchant banks as their underwriters. However, as Second 
Board companies slowly attract more investors, the listing companies also tend to 
consider engaging Tier-1 merchant banks as their underwriters. This can be seen 
as in 1 994, 34 out of 47 or 72% of the companies listed employed Tier-1 merchant 
banks. 
7 Shamsher, M. , Nassir, A.M., and Ariff, M., "Analysis of Underpricing in the Malaysian New Issues Market 
During 1975-1990: Are New Issues Excessively Underpriced?" Capital Market Review, 1994. 
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Table 2 (b) Classification of Underpricing of IPOs Based on the Underwriters Chosen 
TYPE '89 (%) '90 (%) '91 (%) '92 (%) '93 (%) '94 (%) AVERAGE 
Tier-1 71 38 41 42 80 98 62 
Tier-2 - 74 40 29 89 79 62 
AVERAGE 71 56 40 36 85 89 62 
As can be seen from Table 2 (bJ, there is no evidence that IPOs by Tier-1 merchant 
banks tend to have lower underpricing than the IPOs of the Tier-2 merchant banks. 
However, it is important to note that underpricing of new issues is also relatively 
linked to general market conditions. IPOs which come out during bear markets or 
recession time are generally not greatly underpriced. This may be due to a 
generally depressed overall market. 
It may be important, however, not necessary to find an underwriter who is expert in 
certain industry over the others. 8 Such underwriter is more likely to be familiar with 
the structure of the industry, therefore, pricing and syndicating the new issues 
should be easier and further ensure the successful floatation of the issues. 
However, the issue of having certain underwriters specialise in certain industry may 
not be applicable in Malaysia, at least for the time being. There is not really any 
investment bank that specialises In any particular industry. This scenario may be 
attributed by two main reasons; (i) Second Board is only categorised into five 
different industries, which may not raise the need for the investment banks to 
specialise in any particular industry and (ii) majority of the companies going public 
have established banking relationships with certain banking group which also 
provides finance and commercial banking services, therefore, it is only logical if the 
service of the merchant bank of the same banking group is acquired. 
8 ·Chooslng The Right Underwriters For Your IPO," Equity Analytlcs, Ltd 
1.3 Auditors 
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Prior researchers have studied the valuation effects of selecting a credible auditor 
for the IPO. Simunic and Stein (1 987) examined the market premium over book 
value ratio of the market value of equity to its book value concluded that companies 
associated with Big-8 rather than non-Big-8 auditors were able to obtain a higher 
premium. This phenomena is considered acceptable as companies making IPOs 
typically are little known to investors, who, in the absence of alternative source of 
information, must place substantial reliance on the credibility of the auditors. Since 
the actual quality of the audit is not observable, auditors attempt to communicate 
their quality through such signals as brand names and reputations. As a 
consequence, different levels of credibility are offered in the market at different 
fees. 
Table 3 (a) Auditors of The IPOs 
TYPE '89 % '90 % '91 % '92 % '93 % '94 % TOTAL % 
Big� 1 50 4 33 8 44 10 50 17 53 28 60 68 52 
Non-Big� 1 50 8 67 10 56 10 50 15 47 19 40 63 48 
TOTAL 2 100 12 100 18 100 20 100 32 100 47 100 131 100 
This research categorised the auditors involved in the IPOs into two types, namely 
Big-6 and Non-Big-6 auditors. The Big-6 auditors include Coopers & Lybrand, Price 
Waterhouse, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat Marwick, Arthur Anderson and Kassim 
Chan. As shown in Table 3 faJ, the number of companies being audited by Big-6 
auditors are almost the same with Non-Big-6. 
Second Board was only introduced in 1 989. During the first three years, Non-Big-6 
auditors were more acceptable by companies. However, as more companies 
become to realise the important of credible auditors in public listed companies, 
starting 1 992, Big-6 auditors have slowly taken-up a bigger market share at the 
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expense of Non-Big-6 auditors. By the year 1 994, 28 (60%) out of 47 companies 
sought listing on the Second Board engaged 8ig-6 auditors. This has resulted in a 
slight overall domination (52%) of companies audited by 8ig-6 auditors. 
Table 3 (b) Level of Underpricing 
TYPE '89 (%) '90 (%) '91 (%) '92 (%) '93 (%) '94 (%) AVERAGE 
Blg-6 115 75 41 60 79 95 78 
Non.sig-6 27 51 40 22 90 89 53 
AVERAGE 71 63 40 41 811 92 66 
As mentioned earlier, the credibility of the auditors also plays an important role in 
deciding the level of underpricing. Throughout the years of review, except 1993, the 
level of underpricing for companies audited by Big-6 auditors is higher than Non-
Big-6 auditors. Investors perceive companies auditors by Big-6 auditors are more 
prudent and provide more accurate information pertaining to the companies present 
financial statements and also forecast of the companies' future earnings. These 
results are inconsistent to the theory. 
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1.4 Number of Shares Offered 
For a company listed on the Second Board, at least 25% but not more than 50% of 
the issued and paid-up capital of the company is in the hands of the public. The 
supply of the shares in an open market is also believed to play an important role in 
the level of underpricing of companies listed on the Second Board. 
Table 4 Number of Shares Offered 
YEAR AVERAGE PAID-UP AVERAGE NO. OF SHARES PERCENTAGE OF 
CAPJMIL SHARES) OFFERED (MILLION) SHARES OFFERED 
1989 1 7.1 6.1 36 
1990 1 6.5  5.7 34 
1991 1 6.6 5.6 34 
1992 1 7.6 4.6 26 
1993 1 7.9 4.3 24 
1994 1 8.4 4.6 25 
AVERAGE 17.4 5.1 30 
In this study, it is found that the average paid-up capital (number of shares) and the 
average number of shares offered to the public are about 1 7.40 million and 5. 1 
million (or about 30% of the paid-up capital) respectively. Therefore, using 30% of 
the companies' shares in the hands of the public as a benchmark, it is also found 
that the average underpricing for companies which shares are more than 30% 
control by the public is 68%. Conversely, for companies which have less than 30% 
of their shares offered to the public, the level of underpricing is 75%. This scenario 
can be explained using the theory of supply and demand. Under the scarcity of 
supply situation, the demand tends to be high, therefore, the level of underpricing 
tends to be higher too. 
